US President Donald Trump has been portrayed as a protectionist. His immediate cancellation of the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) upon assuming the presidency, as well as his support for the border adjustment tax proposed by the Republican leadership in Congress, seem to confi rm this portrayal of his foreign economic policy leanings. However, a different conclusion emerges from a closer reading of Trump's business interests, of his administration's published trade agenda and of US trade negotiation history. Trump will use large trade defi cits to pressure trading partners to open their markets. Companies that are successful in exporting to the US market will be alarmed by Trump's protectionist announcements and will therefore most likely pressure their governments to give in to the demands of the Trump administration.
In other words, the Trump administration will further the liberalisation of cross-border economic activities. From the perspective of development economics, one could call it fi rst-mover protectionism, because it is about protecting the interests of the most advanced US corporations, which operate on the basis of intellectual property rights and access to large-scale data.
We start with a brief sketch of the president's trade policy powers, followed by a few remarks on Trump's business model. In the main part, we introduce the contending forces within Trump's cabinet and an outline of the administration's trade agenda, both in general and concerning the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in particular. Since Congress is responsible for trade legislation, we present the trade positions taken by the chairpersons of the relevant committees in Congress. We conclude with a reminder of President Ronald Reagan's response to the trade defi cits of the 1980s.
The president's trade policy powers
According to the US Constitution, Congress has authority over matters of international trade. To facilitate the conclusion of trade agreements with other countries, Congress delegates this authority from time to time to the executive branch, allowing the president to conduct negotiations supervised by Congress. After the negotiations are concluded, the fi nal agreement can only be voted up or down in Congress as a total package. The latest legislative delegation occurred with the Trade Promotion Authority from 2015, which is valid until 1 July 2018 and can be extended by the president's request until 1 July 2021, as long as neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate passes an opposing resolution.
1 The law granting this authority states in detail what is to be negotiated, with the top priority being to establish "open, equitable, and reciprocal market access" in other countries. 2 In addition, Congress has delegated the assessment of whether and to what extent domestic producers are injured by foreign trade to an independent, bipartisan agency: the US International Trade Commission (USITC). The determination of discriminatory price-setting by foreign suppliers ("dumping") or state-supported subsidising has been assigned to the Department of Commerce. Several paths for obtaining an exception from liberal import regu-
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lations have been made available to companies and workers who believe they have been injured by import competition. For one, they can request protective measures under "fair" trading conditions by invoking the "escape clause". In this case, they must present evidence to the USITC that an increase in imports is a substantial cause of an existing or impending serious injury. The six USITC commissioners are always composed of three Democrats and three Republicans. If the USITC makes an affi rmative determination, the president must introduce protective measures within a certain time period, for which he may choose from a wide range of designated measures and may end them after two years.
In addition, those affected by imports can inform the Commission, on the basis of the Antidumping Code or the Countervailing Duty Law, that the foreign producers are offering their goods in the US market for a lower price than in their own domestic market ("less than fair value") or have received state subsidies. As part of these proceedings, they must also demonstrate to the USITC that "material injury" has occurred or that the threat of such injury exists. If there is a determination of "unfair" competition, countervailing duties must be levied or "voluntary" self-imposed restrictions must be negotiated with the exporters. 
Trump's business interests
Donald Trump is not engaged in businesses that face import competition. His real estate business in the United States is quite dependent on the fl ow of foreign fi nance. He has made ample use of foreign banks to fi nance his projects. 4 His business abroad is mostly based on fees for branding, i.e. fees for using his name for different kinds of projects. His lawyers are attempting to secure trademark protection for his name in as many countries around the world as possible.
5 Therefore, one can assume that the free fl ow of capital and the protection of brand names are important for him as a businessman.
Trump's cabinet: Economic internationalists in the lead
At fi rst it appeared as though the "America First" faction of the Trump administration was gaining the upper hand. However, the economic internationalist faction has since prevented a strong departure from the traditional liberal foreign economic policy of US presidents. Trump's erratic behaviour, however, makes predictions about the future US economic course diffi cult.
The economic nationalist camp included Trump's Chief Strategist Steve Bannon and Deputy Assistant to the President for Trade and Manufacturing Policy Peter Navarro. The former had to leave the White House, while the latter's unit was moved to report to the internationalistoriented Gary Cohn, the head of the National Economic Council. 6 Important actors now include Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer. During the presidential campaign, Ross co-authored the "Trump Economic Plan", which calls for confronting China about its trade practices and reviewing US membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other trade deals. Despite his co-authorship of this economically nationalist manifesto, Ross promoted the offshoring of production steps as part of his long career as a successful investor. 7 He currently supports the more aggressive enforcement of US trade laws, for example, through the initiation of investigations into whether aluminium and steel imports present a danger to national security. 8 In light of his prior business career, however, it is unlikely that he will support protectionist legislation.
Lastly, there is Lighthizer, the recently confi rmed trade representative, who is the only member of this camp who possesses prior experience in government. During the Reagan presidency, he held a position in the offi ce of the USTR and acquired a reputation for aggressive trade measures against Japan. 9 Later, he warned in particular about China. 10 As the USTR, he will play a prominent role in new trade negotiations.
Standing in opposition to this camp are the advisors and cabinet members who support an economic internationalist position. Among them are Cohn; Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who holds an offi cial advising position in the White House; and the Secretary of the Treasury, Steven Mnuchin. As Kushner is currently under pressure due
